Last week, the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) delivered a landmark ruling in the case concerning Russia’s actions in Ukraine between 11 May 2014 and 16 September 2022 — the period spanning from the onset of hostilities until Russia’s expulsion from the Council of Europe.
In a unanimous judgment, the Court found patterns of widespread and systematic violations of numerous fundamental rights under the European Convention on Human Rights, including the right to life (Article 2), the prohibition of torture (Article 3), the right to liberty (Article 5), freedoms of thought, expression, assembly, and others — as well as key protections under Protocol No. 1, such as the right to property and education. The Court underscored that the scale and nature of violence, coupled with Russia’s rhetoric questioning Ukraine’s right to exist, posed a threat to European peace. It noted that in no previous case had there been such universal condemnation of a state’s “flagrant” breach of the international legal order established after WWII.
The Court also held Russia responsible for the downing of flight MH17. It found that Russia shot down the aircraft, likely by mistake, but that the mistake was unjustifiable under international humanitarian and human rights law. Russia failed to verify its target, put civilians at risk, and then actively obstructed the investigation, provided false information, and prolonged the suffering of victims’ families — all of which amounted to violations of the right to life and inhuman treatment.
While the Court deferred its decision on financial compensation, it emphasised the relevance of the Register of Damage for Ukraine and the ongoing discussions on a future compensation mechanism.
Although Russia is no longer a member of the Council of Europe, it remains bound to comply with the Court’s rulings under Article 46 § 1 of the Convention. The Committee of Ministers will continue supervising the enforcement of this judgment. This historic decision marks a pivotal step in international legal accountability for large-scale human rights abuses during Russia’s aggression against Ukraine.
To analyse the legal significant of this ruling, we spoke to Illia Chernohorenko, DPhil at University of Oxford and member of Ukraine Legal Network.
This Grand Chamber ruling is one of the most consequential in the Court’s history. It found that Russia committed systemic and large-scale violations of nearly all major provisions of the European Convention on Human Rights — including the right to life, prohibition of torture, freedom of expression, and protection from discrimination — during its occupation of Ukrainian territory between May 2014 and 16 September 2022.
The Court also held Russia responsible for the downing of flight MH17. It found that Russia shot down the aircraft, likely by mistake, but that the mistake was unjustifiable under international humanitarian and human rights law. Russia failed to verify its target, put civilians at risk, and then actively obstructed the investigation, provided false information, and prolonged the suffering of victims’ families — all of which amounted to violations of the right to life and inhuman treatment.
Many experts have commented on the legal weight of this judgment — and one of the clearest, most incisive analyses comes from Professor Marko Milanovic here.
In essence:
- The Court adopted a broad but balanced approach to Article 1 jurisdiction, covering all uses of force and rejecting the “context of chaos” argument from Georgia v. Russia (No. 2) — without formally overturning it.
- It handled the intersection between the Convention and international humanitarian law (IHL) pragmatically, refusing to treat IHL as lex specialis.
- It applied the ICJ’s “complete dependence” test from Nicaragua and the Bosnian Genocide case to attribute all relevant conduct by separatist groups to Russia, relying on Article 4 of the ILC Articles on State Responsibility.
- The Court based its factual findings on credible international sources (e.g. UN, OHCHR), placed the burden of proof on Russia, and drew adverse inferences from its obstruction and dishonesty.
- Substantively, the Court identified a pattern of violations: indiscriminate attacks, torture, forced displacement, suppression of language and religion, and abductions of children — treated jointly through the lens of both IHL and the Convention.
- The Court did not address jus ad bellum directly but acknowledged its relevance to the broader human rights context.
This is one of the strongest legal responses ever issued by a human rights court in an armed conflict context.
Inter-State applications before the ECtHR proceed in three stages:
- Admissibility – whether the case is formally receivable: ✅ Completed
- Merits – whether the Convention was violated: ✅ Completed
- Just Satisfaction (Article 41) – determining compensation: ❗Now pending
We are now entering this third important stage, where the focus shifts to implementation, financial redress, and systemic remedies.
The Court postponed awarding just satisfaction — as it often does. It stated that awarding just satisfaction was “not yet ready,” and explicitly linked this delay to the establishment of the Register of Damage under the Council of Europe in 2023.
However, that Register only records damage caused after 24 February 2022. For example:
- A home destroyed in 2016. ❌ Not covered by the Register
- A home destroyed after 16 September 2022. ❌ Beyond the Court’s jurisdiction (Russia was expelled from the Convention)
- A home hit in July 2022. ✅ Could be addressed both by the Court and the Register
The Court opted to postpone awarding just satisfaction, citing the launch of the Register of Damage and the anticipated development of a future international compensation mechanism.
In essence, the Court appears to be taking a strategic approach — allowing time and space for the international community to develop the emerging compensation mechanism. While this stance is understandable, it raises a concern: victims of violations committed before 24 February 2022 may face delayed justice.
Just satisfaction is not a swift process. However, if the Court is implicitly signalling that it intends to wait for a mechanism that does not extend to pre-2022 violations, there is a real risk that these victims will experience unreasonably delayed compensation.
Notably, for the MH17, the Court separated the just satisfaction stage, which was procedurally feasible because that claim had been lodged through a distinct application (No. 28525/20). Similarly, the Court could have more explicitly acknowledged the current issue of the Register of Damage not covering pre-2022 violations, and could have opened a pathway for a separate just satisfaction phase to address violations committed between 2014 and early 2022.
Yet, it has not done so. Instead, the Court merely referred to “the ongoing discussions concerning a future compensation mechanism,” which could be read as an implicit signal that this mechanism might — or even should — cover pre-2022 violations.
The Court’s treatment of this issue is succinct — and, at this stage, understandably so. However, both the interpretation of this part of the judgment and the broader question of whether a similar procedural separation — as adopted for MH17-related violations — can be extended to the wider class of pre-2022 violations remain open and pressing.
Ultimately, the Court could have offered a clearer signal on how it envisions the relationship between the just satisfaction stage and the emerging external compensation framework, particularly regarding their temporal scope and eligibility criteria.
This judgment is a watershed moment for legal accountability in Europe. It affirms the ECtHR’s institutional capacity to deal with complex, conflict-related human rights violations.
The next challenge — and arguably the hardest — is ensuring that victims receive actual remedies.
